Below is the end result of a semester studying Geopolitics and Revolutions of the MENA Region this past semester under Professor Tom O’Donnell. Our group found researching the modern history of Syria and keeping up to date on reports coming out of the country to be extremely interesting and beneficial to our studies of Conflict and Security at The New School University.
To read our group report please click here, 2011 Syrian Uprising Country Report.
“Just remove yourself from that seat before shedding more blood, before torturing more and for the welfare of your country, as well as the region,” Mr. Erdogan
The current state of affairs between Syria and Turkey is relatively complex, especially given the policy changes Turkey had adopted years ago. At the moment, the Assad regime is under clear pressure not only from neighboring countries, i.e., the Arab League which suspended its seat in the Council. Also, the United Nations has publicly condemned the purported killing of more than 5,000 Syrian people since the unrest began in March, 2011. Among the crimes committed by Syria forces since the outbreak of the conflict, there are:
“Cases of torture and ill-treatment of detainees; rife or systematic attacks against civilian population, including the killing of peaceful demonstrators and the use of excessive of force against them; and the persecutions of human rights defenders and activists”.
The Turkish stance is relatively complex, particularly because of the good relations that were being fostered with the Assad regime until the Arab Spring. This political shift, vis-a-vis Syria, has had to change in order to ensure that the Turkish state is not associated with the violent acts perpetuated by the Assad regime. This is largely due to the fact that Turkey had previously announced a general change in the way in which democracy can be adapted to the Middle East; and as a result of the Turkish bid to enter the EU, it also developed a new strategy of becoming an example of Middle East democracy that included, among other things, the changes Turkey adopted, elements that can be potentially exported to other Muslim and Arab countries in their transitions to democracy. However, such an example was not supported by the Assad regime as evidenced by its violent crimes against the Syrian population and international staff stationed throughout Syria.
The shift in the orientation of the Turkish regime did not come immediately after the start of the unrest but rather after repeated attempts by the Turkish side to mitigate, moderate, and advise the Syrian authorities failed. More precisely, as presented by Asli Aydintasbas,
“Four main factors drove Ankara to drop its support for the Asad regime: Assessment that Asad was either too weak or unwilling to reform; influx of refugees; Sunni sentiments and Hama; and Iran’s influence.”
In fact, these aspects focus on several key areas of development that were crucial for the Turkish side. On the one hand, the intent Prime Minister Erdogan had initially envisaged was a clear brokerage of the crisis that was developing in Syria immediately after its onset. This could not, however, materialize due to the weak leverage Assad has within his own structures; and therefore, the possibility that Turkey could have reduced the impact of the Syrian crisis was no longer viable. Thus, Turkey became reluctant to further associate itself with a situation it could not politically mediate. From a political point of view, the failure to ensure Assad’s peaceful commitment towards real reforms was an important sign to Erdogan that the Syrian regime was either unwilling or incapable of making the necessary reforms demanded by the protesters. Therefore, associating with such a regime would not be beneficial for the wider long run foreign policy conducted by the Turkish state in the region.
The two main blocs ‘Syrian National Council’ and ‘National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change’ differ over the urgent questions of dialogue with the Syrian regime and foreign intervention.
The ‘Syrian National Council’, when launched, declared its opposition to any foreign intervention that may affect Syria’s sovereignty but was simultaneously open to a military intervention. The council’s leaders see no contradiction in this, as they spin this intervention as an ‘international intervention’ to protect civilians and not an intervention that targets Syrian sovereignty.The SNC, so far realises that there is no clear pathway or strategy that can plausibly break what is shaping into a stalemate between the regime and protestors. Previously groups such as the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood and the ‘Syrian Revolution General Commission’ have spoken against a military intervention but have changed their tone to accept possibility. According to Burhan Ghalioun,the strategy of the SNC will be to first seek an intervention from Arab and Muslim countries and then widen the circle to include the EU and the US. In terms of ‘protecting civilians’, he views Turkey to be the more suitable country to intervene.
National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change,the main opposition block within Syria strongly oppose to any ‘intervention’, to sectarian and communal incitement and to violence and militarising the uprising.The bloc has openly criticising the SNC in its attempt to monopolise the protest movement.
The “Syria Group” composed of Mike, Eileen and Nina presented a short, comprehensive power point in class addressing the Syrian Uprising of 2011. We covered the common predictors of unrest and revolt and took a look at where Syria fell in comparison to the MENA region in important indicators such as: inflation, press freedom, corruption and joblessness. Additionally the issue of sectarianism, which has made Syria’s uprising different from what we’ve seen in Egypt and Tunisia was discussed. The presentation then flows into who the opposition is and what they want. The two main oppositions within Syria are relatively “headless” and unorganized, however, each group has put forward a different way to resolve the growing unrest in the country. From compromising with the current regime, to a complete military take over. We concluded our presentation by looking at the Geopolitical Importance of Syria. What dog do countries like the U.S., Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, China and Russia have in the fight? How have the leaders of these countries responded to the outbreak in Syria and who has led the charge in stopping Bashar al-Assad or in aiding the regime.
A link to the presentation is provided here: 2011 Syrian Uprising(3)
It appears the goal of the international community, Arab League and regional players is simply to avoid a civil war in Syria. This strategy is benign, if not 2 weeks too late, given evidence indicating that the widespread, once peaceful, demonstrations in Syria have been hijacked by an armed insurgency and sectarian clashes. While Syria’s allies, and some of its less than supportive neighbors, continue to try and avoid the deepening of a civil war based on sectarian lines (if not for Syria’s sake than for their own–ie. Israel wanting to maintain the status quo, Turkey not wanting an influx of Sunni refugees from Syria, Iran not wanting their key ally toppled and Hezbollah in Lebanon wanting to keep a friendly neighbor in Assad) recent signs show that the country is already entangled in a civil war, including the following:
Mona Yacoubian, a senior program officer for the Middle East at the U.S. Institute of Peace, wrote an article in Foreign Policy Magazine in October of 2011 calling for a “controlled collapse” of the current regime as opposed to militant civil war or compromise.
Syrian army defectors pin hopes on prospect of Turkish safe zone
By Suleiman Al-Khalidi
Reuters HATAY Turkey
The prospect that Turkish troops might create a safe zone inside Syria has inspired Syrian army defectors, who say that with such protection they would swiftly be able to mount a rebellion and sweep President Bashar al-Assad from power.
Although Ankara says it is reluctant to intervene across the border, Turkish Foreign Ministry officials have told journalists in recent days that Turkey could be willing to create a buffer zone inside Syria if Turkey were inundated by refugees or if there were massacres in Syrian cities.
Such remarks have caused a stir among Syrian army defectors, who have set up a base for a Free Syrian Army among refugee camps and safe houses here in Turkey’s frontier Hatay province.
“If there is such a zone, the regime will not last for a week,” First Lieutenant Colonel Abdullah Yousef, who fled Syria and joined the Free Army on the Turkish side of the frontier, told Reuters in a safe house provided by a Turkish Arab family on the outskirts of Hatay city.
“Our comrades-in-arms are waiting for the zero hour.”
The index attempts to predict where trouble across the Arab world was most likely to arise by applying a subjective weighting to factors such as the length of time the leader had been in power, GDP per person and the level of democracy. The Economist added two further indicators that were not included in the original:
You can apply your own weightings to each variable to see which country may be the next to experience political upheaval.
To hell with the “Arab Spring!!”
Juan Cole has chimed in on Netanyahu’s recent response to the “Arab Spring.” Regarding the Israeli Prime Minister’s assertion that more should have been done (i.e., by the Obama Administration) to keep Mubarak and Ben Ali in power, Cole notes: Continue reading
Since Mohammed Bouazizi’s self-immolation sparked the Tunisian revolution and the “Arab Spring,” Israel has remained relatively quiet, at least publicly, concerning the domestic unrest challenging its autocratic neighbors in the MENA region. Have the Israelis been at a loss for words? Indifferent? Or perhaps just cautious, even nervous, hoping a Palestinian “Arab Spring” fails to commence? Continue reading
Back in late March, about two weeks into the Syrian regime’s violent response to initial 
domestic unrest, U.S. Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, referred to Syrian President, Bashar al-Asad, as a “reformer.”
In mid-May, the U.S. imposed sanctions on Asad and six of his aides for human rights abuses. In reference to the Syrian people’s demands for more democratic freedoms, President Obama publicly stated that President Asad needed to “lead that transition, or get out of the way.” Continue reading
